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THINK TANKS, TELEVISION NEWS
AND IMPARTIALITY
The ideological balance of sources in BBC
programming
Justin Lewis and Stephen Cushion
Is the use of think tanks ideologically balanced in BBC news and current affairs programming? This
study answers this question empirically by establishing which think tanks are referenced in different
BBC programming in 2009 and 2015, and then classifying them according to their ideological aims
(either left, right, centrist or non-partisan). We draw on a sample size of over 30,000 BBC news and
current affairs programmes in 2009 and 2015 to measure how often these think tanks were men-
tioned or quoted. Overall, BBC news reveals a clear preference for non-partisan or centrist think
tanks. However, when the Labour Party was in power in 2009, left and right-leaning think tanks
received similar levels of coverage, but in 2015, when the Conservative Party was in government,
right-leaning think tanks outnumbered left-leaning think tanks by around two to one. Overall,
our ﬁndings add weight to a pattern emerging from a number of recent academic studies that
show, despite its undoubted commitment to impartiality, BBC news programming has shifted its
centre of gravity to the right. We argue that broadcasters need to be more independently aware
of how stories emerge, and how issues and sources should be balanced and explained in an increas-
ingly partisan news environment.
KEYWORDS impartiality; partisan news environment; public service broadcasting; sources; tel-
evision news; think tanks
Political Balance and Media Visibility: Interpreting “Due Impartiality”
Guidelines
The notions of accuracy and impartiality are enshrined—by both tradition and
statute—in UK broadcast journalism. The media regulator Ofcom requires that “news, in
whatever form, is reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality”,1 and
the United Kingdom’s main broadcasters have well-established practices that embrace
these ideas (Sambrook 2012). This commitment to accuracy and impartiality is a key part
of both the identity and success of broadcast news. While all the United Kingdom’s main
broadcasters are bound by impartiality rules—this commitment is most clearly associated
with the BBC, the United Kingdom’s most widely viewed news broadcaster. Despite com-
petition from online and social media, broadcast news—and the BBC in particular—
remains a popular and widely trusted source of information in the United Kingdom. So,
for example, one survey found that 57 per cent named the BBC as their trusted news
source—far higher than any other UK news outlet (BBC Trust 2017).
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In an era of “fake news” and “post-truth politics”, one of the key challenges facing
broadcasters is maintaining these core values while being part of a changing news
ecology that includes print, online and social media, where there are no obligations or tra-
ditions of fairness or impartiality. This has put notions of impartiality under increasing stress,
in three ways.
First, pressure on broadcasters from other parts of the news ecology has ampliﬁed,
with politicians and partisan media—notably newspapers who resent competition from
a public service news provider—becoming increasingly aggressive in attacking the BBC
for alleged bias (Lewis 2015). Much of this pressure is directed at the BBC, partly because
it is the most popular source of news in the United Kingdom, and partly because its
public funding makes it politically vulnerable.
The most visible source of pressure comes from politicians and newspapers on the
political right—many of whom are unsympathetic to the principle of public service broad-
casting (Lewis 2015). In this politically charged climate, the power of the complainant tends
to matter more than the quality of the evidence. Carefully argued, evidence-based and
peer-reviewed academic research is easier to ignore than a diatribe by a government min-
ister or the editor of the Daily Mail. The danger here is palpable—if broadcasters are to
appease their more vocal critics, they will be more sensitive to accusations that they lean
to the left and less concerned about leaning to the right.
Second, evidence suggests that, regardless of political pressure, a partisan UK press
plays an agenda-setting role for broadcasters (Cushion et al. 2016a). The ecology of news in
the United Kingdom means that broadcasters see the press as a key source of news stories,
and a bellwether of public debate. But because most UK newspapers favour parties and
report issues in ways that favour right-wing perspectives (many of them—the Mail, Sun,
Express and Telegraph—vociferously so), this runs the risk of broadcasters assuming a
centre of gravity that reﬂects the partisan press landscape (Renton and Schlosberg
2017). Research on the coverage of the 2015 General Election campaign, for example,
suggested that broadcasters may have been pushed towards a news agenda that favoured
the Conservative Party (Cushion et al. 2016b).
Third, because broadcast journalists are part of a larger news system, they are inevi-
tably inﬂuenced by the more partisan sector, which, while it may not share values of impar-
tiality (or, in some cases, accuracy), often has a similar set of journalistic assumptions about
what makes a good story. Retaining impartiality amongst the maelstrom of claims, public
relations and political vested interests requires a sense of detachment that is difﬁcult to
maintain (Lewis, Williams, and Franklin 2008). When President Trump claimed on Twitter
that his predecessor—Barack Obama—had wiretapped him, for example, it was widely
reported (such as a Fox News banner reading: “WIRETAPPING FROM THE WH”). Simply by
reporting the story, a BBC breaking news tweet went some way in legitimating it: “President
Trump urges Congress to examine whether Obama abused presidential powers as part of
Russia probe”. Of course, many organisations did point out there was no factual basis for
the claims. However, because of its perceived news value, an unsubstantiated claim (one
Trump no longer makes) was given credibility by partisan media (like Fox News) as well
as a leading international public service broadcaster (see Cushion and Thomas 2018).
In 2016, the EU referendum and the Trump campaign represented a particular chal-
lenge to broadcast news standards, creating moments that put notions of impartiality and
accuracy in conﬂict with one another. Research on the broadcast coverage of the EU cam-
paign, for example, found broadcasters often reported the tit-for-tat exchanges between
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politicians, with statistics traded back and forth, with little evidentiary commentary or
mediation. This made it hard for audiences to assess where the weight of evidence lay
(Cushion and Lewis 2017). The study also found that while broadcasters were successful
in balancing Leave and Remain points of view, they did not feel compelled to underscore
this with a sense of party political balance. Because divisions within the ruling Conservative
Party were regarded as newsworthy, Conservative voices dominated coverage on broad-
cast news, outnumbering centrist or left-wing perspectives by a factor of four to one
(Cushion and Lewis 2017).
These points raise important and critical questions about the practice and mainten-
ance of “due impartiality” and accuracy in broadcast news. There is, however, a lack of
clarity about what constitutes accuracy or impartiality, when these ideas should be put
into practice or how they should be measured. The Chair of the BBC Board, David Clementi,
has proposed the use of a scientiﬁc approach to the measuring of impartiality (cited in
Shermin 2017). Such an approach would appear to be both inevitable and necessary—
not only to offer critical scrutiny but to defend broadcasters from partisan attacks when
the evidence does not support it. There is, however, some resistance amongst practitioners
to this idea. So, for example, when the research group Media Tenor reported ﬁndings
suggesting that over a 15-year period, BBC coverage of the European Union had been sig-
niﬁcantly more negative than positive, the BBC responded with the following statement:
“It’s just not possible to measure impartiality through some sort of mathematical
formula. BBC News reports on the European Union fairly and impartially and we’re satisﬁed
our coverage achieves a proper balance” (cited in Jackson 2016). It is important to note that
rather than offer a methodological challenge to Media Tenor’s research (what constituted
“negative” or “positive” coverage, for example), this rebuttal dismissed the very notion of
applying scientiﬁc forms of measurement to impartiality. The rebuttal is thereby under-
mined by its own logic, rejecting a claim based on content analysis, yet asserting imparti-
ality based on a vague reference to evidence.
Since the BBC has given a great deal of thought to the meaning and interpretation of
due impartiality, this rejection needs to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, we would argue, to
reject the use of any independent criteria with which to make judgements is ultimately
untenable. Without some form of measurement, the absence or presence of impartiality
becomes entirely subjective—simply a question of news judgement about a particular
event or topic without any systematic means of veriﬁcation. The basis upon which the
BBC was “satisﬁed our coverage achieves a proper balance” is entirely absent. Indeed,
broadcasters often do rely on broad mathematical forms of measurement to achieve fair-
ness and balance over a period of time or an event (such as election campaigns—see
Cushion and Thomas 2018), suggesting that impartiality is, in part, something that can
be measured and quantiﬁed.
In 2007, the BBC Trust published a review that sought to redeﬁne impartiality in a
world where opinion did not always fall into two camps. It concluded that
Whereas opinion used to be balanced in simple alternatives—and could be measured in
tilts of the seesaw or swings of the pendulum—nowadays a more appropriate metaphor
might be the many spokes of the wagon wheel…One opinion is not necessarily the exact
opposite of another, nor do they all reach the extremity of available argument (Bridcut
2007)
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Five years later, the Trust commissioned Cardiff University to undertake a breadth of
opinion study to explore whether the impartiality of BBC coverage had, indeed, moved
from a “see-saw” to a “wagon wheel” approach (Wahl Jorgensen et al. 2016). Comparing
BBC news coverage in 2007 and 2012, their study found that a fairly traditional notion of
impartiality—the see-saw approach, or the “paradigm of impartiality-as-balance”—
remained ﬁrmly in place (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2016, 15). This is, perhaps, not surprising
—the wagon wheel metaphor is far more difﬁcult to operationalise than more binary
models of impartiality.
The Cardiff University review also raised questions about the way in which news
values shaped the nature of the binary views on offer. So, for example, debates about
the European Union tended to reﬂect a parochial political debate in which the European
Union was generally seen as a problem. Since domestic politicians have more incentive
to blame the European Union than give it credit, there were few voices articulating the
social, economic and environmental beneﬁts of EU membership or the European Union’s
positive achievements (Wahl Jorgensen et al. 2016).
One of the key questions that underlies discussions of fairness, accuracy and imparti-
ality is an assessment of when to operationalise these ideas. If the weight of evidence falls
on one side rather than another, a commitment to accuracy runs counter to crude notions
of balancing. So, for example, broadcasters have been accused of giving equal weight to
claims about anthropogenic climate change (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004) or to unfounded
claims about the MMR vaccine (Lewis and Speers 2003), thereby distorting a high degree
of scientiﬁc consensus and failing to reﬂect the weight of evidence. Indeed, in response
to a BBC Trust review on their coverage of science, the BBC shifted its editorial position
on the coverage of climate change towards one that acknowledged high levels of scientiﬁc
agreement.
Most of the academic research on impartiality and bias has tended to focus on areas
where there are fairly simple binaries, deﬁned less by the weight of evidence than by a con-
ﬂicting set of ideas or interests. So, for example, the Glasgow Media Group’s work has
focused on the binaries between the views of workers/trade unions and employers/
business leaders (Glasgow Media Group 1995) or between Israelis and Palestinians (Philo
and Berry 2004).
The most long-standing conceptual binary underpinning notions of impartiality in
the coverage of public affairs is a political continuum between left and right. Like all bin-
aries, it has its limitations—some ideas do not ﬁt neatly on a left–right spectrum—but it
nonetheless encapsulates a wide range of political divisions and is often articulated
through party political proxies, most of whom can be positioned somewhere along a
left–right continuum. While much of the research explores areas which relate to a left–
right axis, there has sometimes been a reluctance to use it as a primary gauge to
measure impartiality. So, for example, the BBC Trust’s impartiality reviews have covered a
range of topics including business, religion, immigration, the European Union, rural
affairs, devolution and science. A review explicitly focused on broader questions of political
or ideological impartiality is a notable absence from this list. This is, in part, because of the
sensitivity surrounding these questions.
So, for example, the Trust’s review of business coverage avoided some of the broader
ideological questions about the relationship between business and other interests (BBC
Trust 2007). The report’s desire for a more consensual approach meant that it tended to
assume that business coverage was politically neutral, glossing over the different interests
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of producers and consumers (consumers want the best product at the cheapest possible
price, while businesses want to spend as little on the product as they can and sell it for
as much they can), as well as the differences between business owners and employees.
So while the report acknowledged that “audiences are served in their identity as consu-
mers. But they are not that well served in their role as workers” (BBC Trust 2007, 9), it did
not address the important questions of political impartiality raised by this point. Similarly,
Cardiff University’s research for a Trust review of the coverage of a range of issues found, by
a series of measures, that “Conservative dominance in 2012” of BBC news was “by a notably
larger margin than Labour dominance in 2007” (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2013, 5). While this
would seem to raise very basic issues of political impartiality, it was not explored in the
Trust’s subsequent report.
In this article, we build on these research studies and tackle the issue of political
impartiality head on. There are, of course, many binaries embraced by the principle of
impartiality, but because of its abiding centrality to contemporary politics, we would
argue that the best place to begin a scientiﬁc analysis is to explore the extent to which
news coverage is broadly balanced on a left–right political spectrum.
Hopmann, Van Aelst, and Legnante’s (2012) review of the ﬁeld identiﬁed three main
areas where this kind of political balance has been established or scrutinised in media cov-
erage. These have all tended to focus on those aspects of news coverage that best lend
themselves to coherent systems of measurement. First, media visibility, assessing when
(and for how long) different actors are represented. Second, tone, when coverage is eval-
uated according to whether it is favourable or not towards an actor. Third, issue balance,
where the agenda of news reporting is seen to favour one actor/political standpoint over
another.
When possible, a systematic approach to impartiality should explore all three of these
dimensions. In this article, however, we want to focus on media visibility, in order to scope
out an approach based on a left–right political spectrum. In this study we wanted to focus
on a particular set of actors—think tanks—which play a role in shaping our understanding
of public affairs, which may represent a political perspective but which are not so obviously
deﬁned in political terms.
Thinking About Thinks Tanks
Our study sought to establish the broad ideological range of think tanks that informed
BBC programming in 2009 and 2015. Think tanks represent an important source of knowl-
edge and expertise in most Western democracies (see Kelstrup 2016). They can inﬂuence
the formation of policy, set media agendas and inform public opinion. According to
Ahmad (2008, 534), think tanks constitute “an institute, organisation, corporation or
group that conducts research and engages in advocacy in areas such as social policy, pol-
itical strategy science or technology issues, industrial or business policies, or military
advice”. As they have grown in size and scope over recent decades, scholars have
sought to develop typologies to classify think tanks according to their aims, structures
and afﬁliations. So, for example, McGann and Weaver (2000) developed a typology of
four types of think tank—academic, contract, advocacy and party (political)—according
to their funding, agenda, ideological orientation and research goals.
Our interest in think tanks is part of a broader analysis of the ideological inﬂuence of
news sources and the extent to which they inform media agendas over time, in different
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political contexts and news programming. While many think tanks are not overtly ideologi-
cal, the fact that a signiﬁcant number of them do lean to the left or right provides us with a
fairly straightforward yardstick: just as impartiality requires broadcasters to give parties on
the left and right broadly equal treatment, we would expect an impartial broadcaster to
give roughly equal weight to right-leaning and left-leaning think tanks.
Much of the research about think tanks and ideology comes from the United States,
since partisan organisations have become a more prominent part of its political culture.
These have been termed “advocacy think tanks”, since they actively seek to promote a par-
ticular ideological agenda. Medvetz’s (2012) comprehensive analysis of US think tanks
identiﬁed a rise in well-resourced conservative think tanks since the 1970s, with an
ability to lobby political elites and shape policy agendas. Their inﬂuence has also been
traced in media coverage. Rich and Weaver (2000, 99), for instance, examined six US news-
papers between 1991 and 1998 and discovered “ideological biases… beneﬁting conserva-
tive think tanks in the Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, and think tanks of no
identiﬁable ideology in the New York Times, even after controlling for budget size”. Likewise,
McDonald (2014) examined television, press and radio news reporting of think tanks spe-
cialising in education in 2001 and 2006. She concluded that “conservative think tanks pro-
duced the largest number of education media citations, followed by centrist think tanks.
Liberal/progressive think tanks and university-based education-policy centers had little
to no media presence” (McDonald 2014, 845).
The FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) analysis since 1996 represents the
most comprehensive picture of the presence of think tanks in US media coverage over
time (Dolny 2013). Its annual reviews (up until 2012) have shown that while centrist
think tanks make up the majority of citations, right-leaning think tanks consistently gain
a greater share in media coverage than their left-wing equivalents. According to its 2013
report (which examined major newspapers, radio and television news; Dolny 2013), 46
per cent of think-tank citations were centrist, 35 per cent were right-leaning and 19 per
cent left-leaning.
While the dominance of conservative-based think tanks in US media is well estab-
lished in the literature, the political map of think tanks in other countries (with different
media systems) is less clear (see Kelstrup 2016). Indeed, when compared to many other
media systems, the United States is often viewed as exceptional (Curran 2011; Pickard
2014), since it is primarily market-driven, lightly regulated and, in recent decades, increas-
ingly partisan (Stroud 2011). While the United States has shifted away from broadcast regu-
lations on fairness and balance (Strömbäck and Lee Kaid 2008), many European countries
have maintained regulations about the impartiality of broadcast news coverage of politics
and public affairs (Cushion 2012). However, there are ongoing debates in many advanced
democracies about how to police the impartiality of broadcasting in an increasingly unre-
gulated online and social media environment. Interestingly, research in the United States
also suggests that the success of right-leaning think tanks is not simply a matter of the
growth of right-wing broadcasters (like Fox): the resources available to right-leaning
think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and the Cato
Institute also give them a prominence in traditionally non-partisan media.
The literature about political balance (Hopmann, Van Aelst, and Legnante 2012) also
reveals an “incumbency bonus”where ruling parties attract greater coverage—both of poli-
ticians and allied organisations (such as the more partisan think tanks). Research by Wahl-
Jorgensen et al. (2013, 15–16) in the United Kingdom found a version of the “incumbency
6 JUSTIN LEWIS AND STEPHEN CUSHION
bonus”, but one skewed to the right. Their study found that while the Labour and Conser-
vative Parties were represented in roughly equal proportions when Labour was in power in
2007, when a Conservative-led coalition was in government in 2012, the right-wing party
received signiﬁcantly more media attention. In other words, the ideological balance of
party political coverage favoured the Conservative Party when they were in power and
granted them equitable status with the ruling party when they were in opposition.
Dolny’s review of the coverage of think tanks in the United States, however, found that
—with think tanks at least—this can work the other way, suggesting that “media may
be more open to a progressive economic critique when a Democrat is challenging Repub-
lican policies than when the Democrat is defending his own record” (Dolny 2013).
In order to test the impact of incumbency, we chose two sample years when a centre-
left party (Labour in 2009) and centre-right (Conservatives in 2015) were in power. In 2009,
New Labour had been in power for 12 years, and, as Schlesinger (2009) has documented,
Labour’s policy agenda was heavily inﬂuenced by the rise in more liberal and left-leaning
think tanks. By 2015, however, the Conservatives had been in power (albeit leading a coalition
government) for ﬁve years (later that year they would become the sole governing party after
a General Election). According to Hartwig (2013), a number of right-wing think tanks helped
to develop the Conservative Party’s policy agenda when in opposition and power.
Our study explores whether coverage of think tanks is more ideologically balanced in
the United Kingdom’s more regulated, impartial broadcasting system than it is in the United
States. We chose to focus on BBC news programming because of its prominence in the UK
news ecology and its reputation for editorial independence and impartiality. Political
parties, of course, have relatively clear ideological credentials, whereas the agenda of think
tanks can be more elusive and difﬁcult to determine. Scholars—primarily in the United
States—have developed typologies to classify the type and ideological aims of think tanks
(McGann and Weaver 2000). But in the United Kingdom only one study to date has
sought to label think tanks on a left- or right-wing political spectrum. The Centre for Policy
Studies used a proxy measure to determine a think tank’s ideological leanings, based on
how often they appeared in right and left newspapers over the same period of analysis. In
doing so, they categorised left- and right-wing think tanks according to whether they
were cited in the (left-leaning) Guardian and the (right-leaning) Daily Telegraph.
While this produced a list that correlates very roughly with political afﬁliation, it fea-
tures a series of anomalies, some of which are signiﬁcant. While newspapers clearly have
political preferences, they are indirect, second-hand ﬁlters for assessing the political lean-
ings of sources, especially if no account is taken of the context in which they appear. So,
for example, the Centre for Policy Studies’ list categorises Chatham House as one the
most left-wing think tanks in the United Kingdom, puts the Global Warming Policy Foun-
dation (an outlet for climate change sceptics) on the left side of the ledger and the Institute
for Public Policy Research (IPPR; a think tank associated with the centre-left) on the right.
Our more rigorous methodological approach—as well as conventional wisdom—indicates
that these classiﬁcations are untenable: Chatham House being unafﬁliated, the Global
Warming Policy Foundation right-leaning and IPPR left-leaning. While the Centre for
Policy Studies method has the merit of simplicity, a more robust approach cannot avoid
looking at the think tanks themselves and applying clear criteria to classify them in politi-
cal/ideological terms.
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Sample and Methodology
We used the BBC’s Redux archive to identify when and where think tanks appeared in
BBC coverage. This consisted of over 30,000 BBC television news and current affairs pro-
grammes—the bulk of which were broadcast on the BBC News channel or BBC One in
the years 2009 and 2015 (see Table 1).
We then consulted a wide range of sources to identify think tanks based or operating
in the United Kingdom. This allowed us to compile a list of 134 research institutes/think
tanks (see Appendix A). After entering the names of all 134 think tanks into Redux, we
found that exactly half (67) appeared in or were quoted on BBC news programmes in
2009 and 2015. We then sought to classify this smaller group by political leaning.
Our approach to classifying the political leaming of think tanks was adapted from
Andrew Rich’s (2004) comprehensive analysis of US thinks tanks. This involved ﬁve
elements:
1. In the ﬁrst instance, we looked at a think tank’s self-description, since some think
tanks place themselves on a political spectrum (e.g. the Fabian Society and
Compass on the left and Bright Blue and the Bow Group on the right). Most think
tanks, however, do not overtly self-identify.
2. We then looked for key words or phrases associated with left/right positions, so, for
example, an emphasis on “fairness”, “equality” or “progressive” ideas tends to be
used by left-of-centre think tanks, while an emphasis on “free markets” is associated
with right-of-centre think tanks in the United States. This helped us to categorise think
tanks like the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, the Centre for
Policy Studies and Civitas on the right, and the IPPR, the New Economics Foundation,
the Policy Network and the Intergenerational Foundation on the left.
3. We combined this with an identiﬁcation of ideas that tend to be associated with left or
right positions, e.g. the desire to reduce immigration (right), support for asylum
seekers or refugees (left). So, for example, the Tax Justice Network is an international
organisation campaigning against corporate tax avoidance, a cause which tends to be
associated with the left, while The Scientiﬁc Alliance and the Global Warming Policy
Foundation campaign against or question the scientiﬁc consensus on climate change,
a position now associated with the political right (Whitmarsh 2011).
4. We examined the political backgrounds of members of advisory boards or trustees.
Where there was a preponderance of members afﬁliated with political parties on
the right or left, we categorised the think tank accordingly. So, for example, The
Bruges Group (coded as right-leaning) is run by a Conservative Councillor Robert
Oulds, and has two prominent Conservative politicians as President (Lord Tebbit)
TABLE 1
Sample of news programmes (percentages in parentheses)
Channel 2009 2015
BBC One 3123 (21.1) 2275 (14.3)
BBC Two 944 (6.4) 852 (5.4)
BBC Four 247 (1.7) 250 (1.6)
BBC News 10,472 (70.8) 12,488 (78.7)
Total 14,786 (100) 15,865 (100)
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and Vice President (Lord Lamont). The Electoral Reform Society (coded as left-leaning)
has a Deputy Chief Executive who is a former Labour politician in New Zealand and its
Council and Advisory Committee contains many Labour and Liberal Democrat poli-
ticians and one Green, but no Conservatives.
5. We also looked at non-politicians with clear political associations involved in the
organisations. So, for example, the Director of Policy Exchange is formerly the Chief
Leader Writer on the Daily Telegraph, a newspaper with a long tradition of supporting
the Conservative Party (categorised as right-leaning), while the Equality Trust’s Board
Members include Zoe Williams of the Guardian and a former Senior Policy Ofﬁcer at
the Trades Union Congress (categorised as left-leaning).
There are undoubtedly grey areas between our non-partisan and left/right-leaning
categories. So, for example, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), like many think
tanks, bills itself as objective and non-partisan, and is not tied overtly to any political
party. There is some evidence of non-partisanship: its chairman, former Conservative
leader William Hague, took over from Labour peer Lord Hutton, and it has long-standing
establishment credentials. It is, however, ﬁrmly rooted in the defence and security establish-
ment, and there is a preponderance of Conservative voices in its governance and structure.
There are two Conservative lords and one Liberal Democrat on its Advisory Council, but no
Labour members. The testimony on its home page contains endorsements from four senior
Conservatives, a US Republican (Henry Kissinger), former Directors of the UK Intelligence
Service and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Queen and the King of Jordan. Many of
its positions (e.g. in support of strategic alliances with Gulf States) put it at odds with
human rights groups like Amnesty and certainly with groups like the Campaign Against
the Arms Trade. For this reason, we categorised RUSI as right-leaning.
On the other side of the ledger, the Institute for Government appears to be similarly
non-partisan, but while its board contains ﬁgures from across the political spectrum, its
centre of gravity is moderately centre-left: its Chairman is Labour peer Lord Sainsbury
and the board includes two other Labour politicians—Baroness Amos and Liam Byrne, a
Liberal Democrat and a crossbench peer (Lord Sharkey and Lord Currie) and just one Con-
servative, Lord Finkelstein.
We appreciate that many on the right would see the RUSI as non-partisan, while
many on the left would say the same about the Institute for Government or the Electoral
Reform Society. Equally, some might question the non-partisanship of those we cate-
gorised as non-afﬁliated/centrist. So, for example, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
has been criticised from the left for some of its positions on taxation,2 while during the
EU referendum it received ﬂak from the right for its assessment (in line with most econ-
omists) of the economic costs and beneﬁts of EU membership. Others have argued that
because the members of the IFS are not macro-economists, they tend to focus on balan-
cing budgets. This can be problematic when parties of the left pursue a New Keynesian
macro-economic strategy which favours using public investment to stimulate growth
(and hence increase the size of the budget in the future).3 The fact that criticisms
come from left and right is not a justiﬁcation for classifying the IFS as non-partisan
(this assumes both criticisms are of equal weight), but our criteria are not ﬁnely tuned
enough to classify it as right- or left-leaning.
Our method is, in this sense, limited to clear, veriﬁable criteria. While this may have its
disadvantages (if think tanks keep their partisanship well-hidden, or where ideological bias
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is only established through a forensic examination of its output), it has the advantage of
being replicable and transparent. Our results are outlined in Table 2.
At ﬁrst glance, Table 2 suggests a remarkably high degree of even-handedness in BBC
coverage, with news programmes showing a preference for centrist or non-partisan think
tanks, with equal numbers in the left/right columns. However, when we look at the number
of times each think tank is mentioned over the course of each year, a more precise picture
emerges.
TABLE 2
Political classiﬁcation of think tanks mentioned on BBC news
Left or left-leaning No obvious left/right afﬁliation Right or right-leaning
Fabian Society Institute for Fiscal Studies Bright Blue
Compass Institute of Ideas Bow Group
Institute for Public Policy
Research
King’s Fund Institute of Economic
Affairs
New Economics
Foundation
Chatham House/Royal Institute for
International Affairs
Adam Smith Institute
Intergenerational
Foundation
Joseph Rowntree Foundation Centre for Policy Studies
New Policy Institute Institute for Strategic Dialogue TaxPayers’ Alliance
Tax Justice Network High Pay Centre Civitas
Electoral Reform Society International Longevity Centre Reform
Institute for Government British Future Migration Watch
Demos The Constitution Unit Centre for Social Justice
Centre for European Reform Asia-Paciﬁc Foundation The Bruges Group
Institute of Welsh Affairs European Council on Foreign
Relations
Legatum Institute
Equality Trust Overseas Development Institute The Henry Jackson Society
Policy Network The Work Foundation ResPublica
International Institute for
Environment and
Development
Hansard Society Policy Exchange
Ekklesia International Institute for Strategic
Studies
Royal United Services
Institute
Smith Institute Social Market Foundation The Scientiﬁc Alliance
New Local Government
Network
Think tank Centre for Cities Centre for Social Cohesion
Forum for the Future Centre for Economic Policy Research Global Warming Policy
Foundation
Foreign Policy Centre Centre for European Policy Studies International Policy
Network (now Network
for a Free Society)
Cordoba Foundation
Institute of Development Studies
European Policy Centre
Million +
National Centre for Social Research
Centre for Economic and Social
Inclusion (has since merged and
become the Learning and Work
Institute)
Unlock Democracy
Think tanks in italics only appear in 2009.
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BBC News Programmes and the Use of Think Tanks in 2009 and 2015
We counted the number of times a think tank was mentioned during programmes.
Table 3 shows that BBC programmes tend to favour non-partisan or centrist think tanks,
a ﬁnding partly explained by the widespread use of the IFS—by far the most used think
tank across the BBC (see Tables 4 and 5, which list the top 10 most cited think tanks in
each category). Indeed, such was its predominance, that the IFS alone constitutes 47 per
TABLE 4
Most cited think tanks in 2009
Think tank
Number of
mentions
Left (L), centre or non-partisan
(C), right (R)
Institute for Fiscal Studies 434 C
Chatham House/Royal Institute for
International Affairs
54 C
The Work Foundation 42 C
International Institute for Strategic Studies 20 C
Asia-Paciﬁc Foundation 9 C
Hansard Society 9 C
Million + 6 C
Social Market Foundation 5 C
Cordoba Foundation 3 C
Institute of Ideas 4 C
Royal United Services Institute 29 R
Centre for Social Justice 16 R
Migration Watch 17 R
TaxPayers’ Alliance 12 R
Reform 14 R
Centre for Policy Studies 20 R
Centre for Social Cohesion 9 R
Policy Exchange 11 R
Adam Smith Institute 8 R
The Bruges Group 9 R
Institute for Public Policy Research 55 L
Compass 18 L
New Economics Foundation 18 L
Centre for European Reform 8 L
Electoral Reform Society 8 L
Foreign Policy Centre 8 L
Forum for the Future 8 L
Fabian Society 6 L
Policy Network 6 L
Demos 5 L
TABLE 3
Number of mentions of think tanks in BBC programmes by political orientation (percentages
in parentheses)
Centrist/non-partisan Left Right
Mentions in 2009 604 (65.2) 153 (16.5) 169 (18.3)
Mentions in 2015 1585 (75.3) 175 (8.5) 340 (16.2)
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cent of all references to think tanks in 2009 and more than half the total number of refer-
ences (54 per cent of 2100) in 2015.
Table 3 also indicates a clear shift to the right in the BBC’s choice of think tanks. In 2009,
there was a broad balance between left and right think tanks—left-leaning think tanks
receiving 16.5 per cent of think-tank references and right-leaning think tanks receiving
18 per cent. In 2015, references to right-leaning think tanks remain at a similar level
(16.2 per cent) while references to left-leaning think tanks are halved to just 8.5 per cent.
To put it into a broad political context, when Labour was in power, the BBC’s use of
think tanks was relatively even-handed, but when a Conservative-led coalition was in
power, the centre of gravity shifted to the political right.
This ﬁnding echoes one of the few other studies to make direct comparisons
between recent Labour and Conservative periods in ofﬁce. Wahl-Jorgensen et al. (2013),
in their impartiality review for the BBC Trust, compared BBC coverage in 2007 (Labour in
power) with 2012 (a Conservative-led coalition in power). They found fairly equal
TABLE 5
Most cited think tanks in 2015
Think tank
Number of
mentions
Left (L), centre or non-partisan
(c), right (R)
Institute for Fiscal Studies 1126 C
King’s Fund 213 C
Chatham House/Royal Institute for
International Affairs
65 C
Joseph Rowntree Foundation 35 C
Institute for Strategic Dialogue 31 C
High Pay Centre 15 C
International Longevity Centre 28 C
British Future 9 C
The Constitution Unit 11 C
Asia-Paciﬁc Foundation 8 C
European Council on Foreign Relations 8 C
Royal United Services Institute 133 R
Institute of Economic Affairs 56 R
Policy Exchange 30 R
Centre for Social Justice 33 R
The Henry Jackson Society 12 R
Centre for Policy Studies 17 R
Migration Watch 12 R
Adam Smith Institute 9 R
ResPublica 9 R
TaxPayers’ Alliance 7 R
Electoral Reform Society 74 L
Fabian Society 31 L
Institute for Government 21 L
Institute for Public Policy Research 19 L
Demos 8 L
The Intergenerational Foundation 10 L
New Economics Foundation 4 L
Centre for European Reform 3 L
Equality Trust 1 L
New Policy Institute 1 L
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representation of Labour and Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) in 2007 (with a
slight favouring of Labour MPs) but in 2012 a signiﬁcant imbalance towards the Conserva-
tives (though not, oddly, towards their coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats). So, in
2007, Conservative MPs made up 41 per cent of those politicians quoted, compared to
45 per cent of Labour MPs. In 2012, Conservative MPs increased their representation to
48 per cent of those quoted, while the proportion of Labour MPs dropped dramatically
to just 26 per cent. Their data show similar patterns for party leaders and ministers/
shadow ministers. In other words, both our data and those of Wahl-Jorgensen et al.
suggest that the BBC has moved from a fairly even-handed approach during Labour
years towards a preference for conservative voices in Conservative years.
If we compare the most commonly used think tanks in 2009 and 2015 (Tables 4
and 5), we see some continuity—the popularity of the IFS, Chatham House and the
RUSI is consistent across both years. In keeping with the rightward shift, however, we
see a signiﬁcant fall in the use of some left-leaning think tanks. In 2009, the three
most cited left-leaning think tanks—the IPPR, the New Economics Foundation and
Compass—comprised, between them, almost 10 per cent of think-tank references. By
2015, all three remained active but had almost disappeared from BBC news, with
around 1 per cent of think-tank references between them.
We should note that these ﬁndings are at odds with the Centre for Policy Studies
research, which suggested that because the BBC’s choice of think tanks correlated more
closely with the Guardian’s than the Telegraph’s, it demonstrated that the BBC’s centre of
gravity is on the left. This disparity is largely explained by their methodology, which we
described earlier. So, for example, their classiﬁcation of the oft-quoted Chatham House
as very left-wing signiﬁcantly skews their data—so while Chatham House may have
received more coverage in the Guardian, by any independent criteria they are either cen-
trist or non-partisan.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, when we tested the Centre for Policy Studies’ study
rankings in our 2015 data-set, we found that it suggested a more dramatic right-wing
bias than our own. If we split its list into roughly equal thirds (14 right-leaning, 13 non-par-
tisan, 14 left-leaning) and map it across our data, we ﬁnd right-leaning think tanks consti-
tute 69 per cent of all think-tank mentions, compared to 13 per cent on the left. Their
ranking of the IFS as a right-leaning think tank—given its popularity on the BBC—clearly
distorts the picture, but even if the IFS is removed, the Centre for Policy Studies’ list still pro-
duces 38 per cent of think-tank references on the right and 25.5 per cent on the left.
Although this may suggest that its ﬁndings reﬂect our study, for reasons already outlined
we consider that our own method of political classiﬁcation is more robust.
Table 6 shows that the 2015 imbalance (between left and right references to think
tanks) differs across themany BBC outlets. BBC Four (which has one regular news programme,
World News Today) is the most balanced, although the numbers here are small. BBC One, the
BBC’s most popular channel (which features its ﬂagship news bulletins) favours centrist or
non-partisan think tanks and has a less signiﬁcant rightward tilt than the BBC News
channel, which combines news and current affairs programming. News/current affairs pro-
grammes on BBC Two very clearly favour right-wing think tanks. This is mainly accounted
for by two current affairs programmes, Daily Politics and Newsnight, where the ratio of
right-leaning to left-leaning think tanks is a striking six to one. In other words, while most
BBC outlets generally favoured right-wing think tanks, this was least pronounced in conven-
tional broadcast news bulletins and most dramatic in current affairs programming.
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Sourcing Think Tanks: Rising to the Challenge of a Partisan News
Environment
Our ﬁndings indicate that when a Labour government was in power, the BBC was
generally even-handed in its use of think tanks—favouring centrist or non-partisan organ-
isations and giving fairly equal weight to those on the right and left. In the more recent
period of Conservative rule, centrist or non-partisan think tanks are still preferred, but
the use of left-leaning think tanks drops signiﬁcantly.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, overall, the United Kingdom has not mirrored the
United States in reﬂecting a think-tank culture where many of the big beasts (such as
the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation) are
on the political right. Most of the most quoted think tanks on the BBC are centrist or
non-partisan, while the list of think tanks used by the BBC across both periods is remark-
ably balanced. In this sense, the BBC appears acutely aware of its commitment towards
impartiality, largely drawing on sources that are not ideologically disposed to left- or
right-wing perspectives. Nonetheless, in 2015, we found a subtle but signiﬁcant shift
towards favouring right rather than left-leaning think tanks, most strikingly in current
affairs programming.
Overall, we would argue that our ﬁndings should be understood in the context of a
number of recent studies, all of which suggest that the BBC has, in recent years, moved its
centre of gravity to the right. As we have indicated, the comparative study of Wahl-Jorgen-
sen et al. (2013, 2016) showed relative even-handedness in terms of party political rep-
resentation (indeed, a small degree of pro-Labour bias) when Labour was in power,
switching to a clear Conservative Party dominance when the Conservatives were in govern-
ment after 2010. Other studies of more speciﬁc issues or time periods reinforce this picture.
Berry’s (2016) research on the BBC’s economic coverage found that the BBC replicated a
Conservative pro-austerity narrative following the 2008 economic crisis, while a study
examining television news coverage of the 2015 General Election campaign identiﬁed
that the BBC was more likely to follow the Conservative rather the Labour Party’s issue
agenda and was inﬂuenced by the editorial agenda of right-wing newspapers (Cushion
et al. 2016a). Most recently, research about television news coverage of the 2016 EU
referendum (Cushion and Lewis 2017) found that while the BBC—and broadcasters in
general—were scrupulously even-handed in representing the Leave and Remain
campaigns, they signiﬁcantly favoured right-wing sources during the campaign.
While none of these studies are conclusive, they do suggest a pattern. Since the BBC
is clearly committed to impartiality, how can a right-wing shift in the sources used by news
and current affairs programming be explained? A closer look at the ﬁnancial resources or
public relations strategies of think tanks—beyond the scope of this study—may provide
TABLE 6
Mentions of think tanks by percentage on BBC channels in 2015 (percentages in parentheses)
Left Centre or non-partisan Right
BBC One 36 (8.9) 319 (78.3) 52 (12.8)
BBC Two 11 (6.1) 119 (65.7) 51 (28.2)
BBC Four 2 (11.1) 14 (77.8) 2 (11.1)
BBC News 130 (8.6) 1140 (75.6) 238 (15.8)
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some insight. But one visible inﬂuence on BBC programming over recent years has come
from the bullish and campaigning right-wing UK press (notably the Mail, the Express, the
Telegraph and the Sun) who dislike public service broadcasting for both commercial and
ideological reasons (Lewis 2014, 2015). There is no equivalent pressure coming from the
left (the United Kingdom’s two left-leaning newspapers, the Guardian and the Mirror, do
not put pressure on the BBC).
Following the 2017 General Election when—in spite of ﬁercely negative press cover-
age—the Labour Party won a far greater share of votes than many predicted, several com-
mentators suggested the rise of new news sites and sharing platforms such as Facebook
have diminished the inﬂuence of the right-wing press (Jackson 2017). While the United
Kingdom’s media ecology is clearly changing, we would argue it is premature to suggest
the agenda-setting power of right-wing newspapers is over. Newspapers, after all, continue
to inform broadcast programming and are widely read by journalists, policy makers and
politicians. Indeed, while the broader media ecology has become more diverse, broadcas-
ters continue to privilege the UK press (in ways that reﬂect rather that ﬁlter their biases) as a
source of content and opinion (see Renton and Schlosberg 2017).
In our view, public service broadcasters must rise to this challenge by maintaining a
commitment to impartiality by keeping a distance from—rather than too easily reﬂecting—
powerful partisan inﬂuences; or, to put it another way, to be impartial requires a clear
understanding of the lack of impartiality elsewhere, and a more independent awareness
of how stories emerge, and how issues and sources should be balanced and explained.
More closely monitoring which think tanks inform their programming is one way the
BBC—and other broadcasters—can more carefully safeguard impartiality in an increasingly
partisan media environment.
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NOTES
1. Quote taken from Ofcom’s webpage: www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/
broadcast-codes/broadcast-code.
2. See www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/19/tax.taxandspending.
3. See https://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/but-do-numbers-add-up.html.
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Appendix A
List of think tanks
Think tank Alternative search terms
1. Adam Smith Institute
2. Africa Research Institute
3. Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of
Industrial Society
4. Asia-Paciﬁc Foundation
5. Bow Group
6. Boyd Group
7. Bright Blue Bright Blue think tank, think tank Bright
Blue
8. British Future British Future think tank, think tank British
Future
9. British Institute of International and Comparative
Law
10. The Bruges Group
11. Building and Social Housing Foundation
12. Catalyst Catalyst think tank, think tank Catalyst
13. Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion
14. Centre for Cities Centre for Cities think tank, think tank
Centre for Cities
15. Centre for Cross Border Studies
16. Centre for Defence and International Security
Studies
17. Centre for Economic and Social Exclusion
18. Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation
19. Centre for Economic Policy Research
20. Centre for Economics of Education
21. Centre for Enterprise
22. Centre for European Policy Studies
23. Centre for European Reform
24. Centre for Labour and Social Studies
25. Centre for London
26. Centre for Policy Studies
27. Centre for Social Cohesion
28. Centre for Social Justice
29. Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis
30. Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation
31. CentreForum [formerly Centre for Reform] Centre Forum
32. The Cobden Centre
33. Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit
34. Compass Compass think tank, think tank Compass
35. The Constitution Unit
36. Cordoba Foundation
37. Cornerstone Group
38. Counterpoint Counterpoint think tank, think tank
Counterpoint
39. City Mayors Foundation
40. Civitas
41. Crime and Society Foundation
42. Chatham House
(Continued )
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(Continued )
Think tank Alternative search terms
43. Credos
44. Defence Synergia
45. Demos Demos think tank, think tank Demos
46. The Education Foundation
47. Ekklesia
48. Electoral Reform Society
49. Equality Trust
50. European Council on Foreign Relations
51. European Policy Centre
52. European Policy Forum
53. Fabian Society
54. The Federal Trust
55. Foreign Policy Centre
56. Forum for the Future
57. Global Ideas Bank
58. Global Warming Policy Foundation
59. Global Vision Global Vision think tank, think tank Global
Vision
60. Globalization Institute
61. Gold Mercury International
62. Green Alliance
63. Green Economics Institute
64. Green House Think Tank think tank Green House
65. Halsbury’s Law Exchange
66. Hansard Society
67. The Henry Jackson Society
68. High Pay Centre
69. Independent Transport Commission
70. Innovation Unit (all results were referring to something else)
71. Institute for Advanced Study
72. The Institute for Employment Rights
73. Institute for Fiscal Studies IFS
74. Institute for Government
75. Institute for Jewish Policy Research
76. Institute for Public Policy Research IPPR
77. Institute for Social Inventions
78. Institute for Strategic Dialogue
79. Institute of Development Studies
80. Institute of Economic Affairs
81. Institute of Ideas
82. Institute of Race Relations
83. Institute of Welsh Affairs
84. The Intergenerational Foundation
85. International Growth Centre
86. International Institute for Environment and
Development
87. International Institute for Strategic Studies
88. International Longevity Centre
89. International Policy Network
90. Involve Involve think tank, think tank Involve
91. Joseph Rowntree Foundation
92. Jubilee Centre
(Continued )
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(Continued )
Think tank Alternative search terms
93. King’s Fund
94. Legatum Institute
95. Localis
96. LSE IDEAS
97. The LSE Research Laboratory
98. Manchester Institute of Innovation Research
99. Migration Watch
100. Million + Million Plus think tank, think tank Million
Plus
101. Mutuo
102. National Centre for Social Research
103. National Economic Foundation
104. New Economics Foundation
105. New Frontiers Foundation
106. New Local Government Network
107. New Policy Institute
108. New Politics Network
109. Overseas Development Institute
110. Policy Exchange
111. Policy Network
112. Policy Studies Institute
113. Politeia
114. Forum for Social and Economic Thinking
115. Reform Reform think tank, think tank reform
116. Regulatory Policy Institute
117. ResPublica
118. Royal Institute for International Affairs
119. Royal United Services Institute RUSI
120. The Scientiﬁc Alliance
121. Science and Technology Policy Research
122. Scottish Council Foundation
123. ShareAction
124. Social Affairs Unit
125. Social Issues Research Centre
126. Social Market Foundation
127. Smith Institute (All seem to be “Adam Smith Institute”)
128. Tavistock Institute for Human Behaviour
129. TaxPayers’ Alliance
130. Tax Justice Network
131. Theos Theos think tank, think tank Theos
132. Unlock Democracy
133. The Work Foundation
134. The Young Foundation
20 JUSTIN LEWIS AND STEPHEN CUSHION
